Your definition of belief, in this instance, is different to mine but nonetheless perfectly valid, and I accept that empiricism does not require belief in that sense. However, as my definition of belief is also valid, there is an ambiguity, which you do not seem prepared to accept.
...because it was my assertion that proof negates belief, and the kind of belief I am referring to is quite specific.
To then argue that I'm wrong by virtue of there being another definition of the word belief, one I have explicitly stated that I do not adhere to, seems, to me, to be disingenuous.
As I say, it is simply semantics, and I am not arguing against you in that belief as you define it is not required for acceptance of empirical truths, nor am I trying to somehow manipulate the definition of belief to undermine your case.
Then...I don't see the point in bringing it up, honestly. I mean, I've made my position pretty clear; arguing semantics seems like splitting hairs, contrarian. I don't grok the point of throwing a different definition of 'belief' out there in this circumstance.